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Abstract 
 
The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) has become the most 
predominant protocol for Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) 
signaling. Security of SIP is an important consideration for VoIP 
communication as the traffic is transmitted over the insecure IP 
network. And the authentication process in SIP ranges from pre-
shared secret based solutions to Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 
based solution. However, due to the limitations in PKI based 
solutions, some PKI less authentications mechanisms are 
proposed. This paper aims to present an overview of different 
authentication methods used in or together with SIP. We start by 
highlighting the security issues in SIP in the context of VoIP 
communication. Then we illustrate the current activities 
regarding the SIP authentication mechanisms including the 
recent developments in the research community and 
standardization efforts within the Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF). Finally we analyze the security aspects of these 
approaches. 
 
Keywords: SIP, VoIP, Authentication, Key exchange, Public 
Key Infrastructure. 
1. Introduction 
The SIP [1] is an application-layer protocol for managing 
sessions standardized by the IETF. SIP is a protocol 
generic enough for being used not only for Internet-
Telephony, but for any application that requires the 
management of sessions, such as multimedia distribution, 
instant messaging [2], online gaming [3] etc. In the 
specific case of VoIP, SIP appears as an alternative to 
ITU-T’s (ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector) 
H.323 [4] standard and proprietary standards such as the 
standard used by Skype. SIP is used as the signaling 
protocol whereas Real-Time Transport Protocol (RTP) is 
used to provide   the multimedia   channel.  SIP   gained 
greater attention being chosen as the signaling protocol for 
the 3GPP (Third-Generation Partnership Project) IP 
Multimedia System [5]. 
 
The SIP message flow can be described with the trapezoid 
illustrated in Fig. 1, where the SIP User Agent client tries 
to establish a media session with the SIP User Agent 
Server of another terminal (it is necessary to the SIP 
terminal to have both agents in order to initiate sessions 
and respond to requests).  
 
 
Fig. 1  SIP Trapezoid. 
Initially, the client possesses only the Uniform Resource 
Identifier (URI) of the other user agent. Afterwards, the 
client forwards the session invitation to the Outbound 
Proxy Server, which will consult a Domain Name System 
(DNS) server to find the Inbound Proxy Server for the 
destination User Agent. Once the Outbound Proxy 
forwards the invitation to the Inbound Proxy, this last one 
will look up for the location of the destination agent in the 
Location Server and then forward the invitation to its final 
destination. Until the session is established, the messages 
follow the path: User Agent Client - Outbound Proxy - 
Inbound Proxy – User Agent Server. Afterward, the media 
session is transmitted directly between the User Agents 
through RTP instead of using SIP. A simple message 
session set-up in SIP can be described as a 3-way 
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handshake with an invitation message from the caller, an 
OK answer from the destination and, an ACK from the 
initiator. On the other hand, for the session termination, 
one BYE message is enough. Several other scenarios are 
presented [6], and several method extensions have been 
proposed to the protocol, such as: the SIP info method and 
the extension for instant messaging [2]. 
 
When it comes to the security of SIP, several aspects must 
be taken into consideration. First of all, SIP carries data 
that can be considered sensitive (such as the parties URIs, 
which could consist of their phone numbers, IP addresses) 
and it indirectly generates a traffic pattern that can 
potentially give some information about the call. Besides 
confidentiality, there is the need to assure the identity of 
the communicating parties and the integrity of the 
messages on the session management, so an attacker can’t 
alter the session or masquerade a user. There are also the 
issues of attacks against the protocol itself such as Denial 
of Service or SPAM over Telephony IP (SPIT). At last, 
SIP is also one of the channels to exchange or agree in the 
key material used to protect the media traffic.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to describe different 
authentication methods that are behind the SIP and 
analyze the security aspects of the available mechanisms.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the 
section 2, we present and discuss the SIP Authentication 
Mechanisms. Then, at section 3, we elaborate some PKI 
less alternatives which encompass authentication and key 
agreement at the same time. Later, we present an analysis 
of different the authentication mechanisms in section 4. 
Finally, the paper is ended with the conclusion at section 5. 
2. SIP Authentication Mechanisms 
Authentication process is necessary to ensure that the 
communication is going to take place only among the 
legitimate users. In SIP, proper authentication is necessary 
while the participant wants to register or setup, modify or 
terminate as session. Different authentication mechanisms 
work at different layers. Table 1 presents the SIP 
authentication mechanism at different layers. 
2.1 SIP Digest Authentication 
SIP Digest Authentication mechanism [1] is originally 
based on HTTP Digest mechanism [7]. This is a 
challenge-response paradigm which is used for client-to-
client or client-to-proxy authentication. In this scheme, the 
recipient can challenge the identity of the sender using a 
nonce value. In response to this challenge, the sender 
sends a message digest calculated using this nonce, 
username, shared secret and some other optional 
parameters. 
Table 1: SIP Authentication mechanisms at different layers 
HTTP Basic 
Authentication 
SIP Digest 
Authentication 
 
Extended SIP 
Digest 
Authentication 
S/MIME SIP AIB 
Application 
Layer 
Mechanism 
ID-Based 
Authentication 
Certificate-less 
Authentication 
Transport Layer TLS DTLS 
Network Layer IPSec  
 
SIP Digest Authentication method uses five different 
headers for authentication namely: WWW-Authenticate, 
Authorization, Proxy-Authenticate, Proxy-Authorization 
and Authentication-Info. In this scheme, whenever any 
request from a SIP user agent needs to be authenticated, 
the recipient, for example a user agent, register or redirect 
server, challenges the originator by sending a 401 
Unauthorized message with a WWW-Authenticate header. 
The header contains a nonce value and a realm in addition 
to some optional parameters. A nonce is a unique string 
generated each time the “401 Unauthorized” message is 
sent and the realm specifies the digest algorithm used for 
the challenge. After receiving this challenge, the client 
computes the response value using the nonce value, realm, 
username, shared secret with some optional parameters 
which is then included in the Authorization header in the 
new request message. By default, MD5 algorithm is used 
to compute this response value unless a different algorithm 
is specified in the realm parameter during the challenge. 
Fig. 2 illustrates the SIP Digest authentication mechanism. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 SIP Digest authentication mechanism. 
However, if the recipient is a proxy server, then a 407 
unauthorized message with a Proxy-Authenticate header is 
sent instead of a 401 message to challenge the client. The 
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client then includes a Proxy-Authorization header in reply 
to that challenge. 
 
Upon receiving the re-issued request, the recipient should 
verify that the authenticated user is authorized to perform 
the requested action. If the authorization fails, the recipient 
may respond with another challenge.  
2.2 S/MIME Authentication 
SIP messages are capable of carrying the Multipurpose 
Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) bodies. 
Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) 
is used for providing the end to end confidentiality and 
integrity of the MIME content to some extent by 
replicating the header fields in the MIME part [8]. This 
scheme can also be used for authentication services by 
signing the replicated header fields to verify the identity of 
the sender. The S/MIME can be used to protect MIME 
payloads, such as the Session Description Protocol (SDP) 
data which is embedded on the application/sdp MIME 
body, contained in the SIP message by using the types 
multipart/signed or application/pkcs7-mim. S/MIME 
can be also used to protect the whole package through the 
creation of an S/MIME tunnel. Fig. 3 illustrates the SIP 
S/MIME authentication mechanism. 
 
 
Fig. 3 SIP S/MIME authentication process. 
 
In this process, SIP User Agent (UA) creates the SIP 
message and attaches a MIME body to it. Then the UA 
creates a multipart/signed S/MIME entity, that contains 
the MIME body and an application/pkcs7-signature 
S/MIME entity. Afterwards, UA signs the MIME body by 
using its private key and includes the public key certificate 
in the CMS object of the application/pkcs7-signature 
S/MIME entity and then it sends the message. The 
receiving SIP UA takes the message apart and tries to find 
the included public key certificate in its keyring. If a 
public key certificate, in the keyring, has a subject that 
matches the From1 header field in the SIP message, then 
the receiving SIP UA should compare it with the received 
certificate. If there is a discrepancy between them, the SIP 
UA should notify the user and acquire the user’s 
permission before continuing the session. 
2.3 Proxy based Authentication 
In the Proxy based authentication and encryption approach 
[9], a single certificate is used for a group of clients 
having the same role e.g. employees of a customer call 
center, to encrypt and sign the messages. In this scheme, 
an extension of the standard SIP proxy will be responsible 
for forwarding as well as signing and encrypting the 
messages. And for signing and encrypting the messages, a 
group based private key will be installed on this central 
proxy server. Generally, the validation of the signature 
and the decryption process will be done by the receiving 
terminal. However, these tasks can also be done by this 
proxy server on behalf of the clients and then the validated 
and decrypted messages will be forwarded to the receiving 
devices. Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 illustrate the call establishment 
and validation using proxy server. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 Call establishment process with call center validated agent. 
 
This is a suitable approach for specific scenarios such as 
the call center or support team of a company where it is 
convenient to have a group key, since it is easier for 
customers to manage just one certificate and, in those 
contexts, the person in the call center, for example, is 
signing the message as a representation of the call center 
answer and not as his answer (it may be desirable to 
provide anonymity to him). 
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Fig. 5 Automatic proxy validation for call with call-center-validated 
agent. 
 
Another benefit provided by having the encryption, 
decryption, and signing and signature verification on the 
proxy side is that all those costly operations no longer 
need to be done in the end-terminals behind the secure 
proxy, which is very convenient for devices with limited 
resources. 
3. PKI less Authentication Mechanism and 
Key Agreement Protocols 
Due to challenges on building up a global Public Key 
Infrastructure capable of supporting the possible strong 
authentication methods (the HTTP Digest Access 
Authentication by itself is not considered a strong 
authentication method, as pointed out in [7]), some PKI-
less alternatives have been proposed to address the 
authentication issue in SIP. 
3.1 Identity-based protocol 
Identity-based (ID-based) protocol is based on the scheme 
of ID-based Cryptosystems, which was introduced with 
[10]. What Shamir proposes in his cryptographic scheme 
is that the public key of the user would be based (as a 
result of a predefined and global hash function for 
example) on one of his single identifier, such as his e-mail 
address, physical address, full name, ID number or even a 
combination of those. Then, the matching private key 
would be provided by a third party entity that would act as 
the Public Key Generator (PKG).  
 
Once the public key corresponds to the user’s identity, 
there is no need having the parties to exchange keys prior 
to the communication. Furthermore, it is possible to 
achieve non-repudiation and protection against the Man-
in-the-Middle attack once the message is signed and it is 
easy to identify the owner of the signature based on the 
public key, which corresponds to the user identity. On the 
other hand, the security of the scheme relies on the trust in 
the PKG, on the security of the transmission of the private 
key from those PKGs to the user, on that the user will 
keep the private key securely, and, at last, on the security 
of the public key cryptographic algorithms used. 
 
The public key scheme used for identity based 
cryptography must be so, that chosen the secret seed k, it 
is computably easy to generate a private key for a public 
key, but it is computably infeasible to trace the seed based 
on the public-private pairs generated, and, to attack one of 
the generated private keys with the possession of other 
generated pairs. This system ends up creating a key 
escrow (once the private keys are generated by a third 
party) and making it complex the process of key 
expiration and revocation, due to the identity nature of the 
public key. Although, one possible attempt to face the 
expiration problem is to have the identity key linked with 
its validity (the identity could be for example: 
"myself@mydomain.com + expiration-date"), and that the 
identity validity could be shortly limited, like to one day. 
Then, in order to revoke the key, it is just necessary that 
the PKG stops providing new private keys to the user. 
Adding the validity to the identity would also require to 
the user to get a new private key every day he needs to 
sign a message.  Identity-based encryption proposed by 
Boneh [11] relies on the Weil pairing on elliptic curves 
where he pointed that the trust on the PKG in the identity-
based scheme can be distributed among other sites through 
the use of threshold cryptography [12], and therefore 
reduce the risk severity of a compromised PKG and also 
raise the control over the key escrow.  
 
The usage of the identity-based concept in SIP is 
presented by Ring et al. [13], where the id-based 
cryptosystem provides mutual authentication for the SIP 
protocol and, afterward, enable a key exchange agreement 
to generate the encryption key for the multimedia traffic. 
Concerning the authentication, it bases that the Proxy 
Server, would most likely represent the service provider, 
institution or company, and that it will act as the PKG. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6 ID-Based Authentication. 
The authentication towards the Proxy is done through the 
usage of its public-private key and through the key pair of   
the client (besides a nonce created using the time stamp 
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and server realm string (identity of the server) to 
strengthen the protocol against Man-in-the-Middle attacks 
and replay attacks). The authentication messages flow is 
described in the Fig. 6 
 
The mutual authentication between both clients is 
achieved through the signing of the messages exchanged 
in the key exchange protocol, which works in the 
following manner: 
 
• The initiator generates a temporary private key and 
sends his temporary public key signed by his 
permanent private key. 
• The receptor verifies the signature against the 
sender’s identification and also generates an 
ephemeral public pair, and reply with the temporary 
public key signed by his permanent private key. 
• Then, both parties can generate the same temporary 
session key using their identities and public keys 
(both the ephemeral and the permanent one), with the 
bilinear pairing over elliptic curves. 
 
J. Ring et al. argue that the usage of this authentication 
and key-exchange mechanism can be introduced in the 
SDP by just setting the "a" attribute defined with the 
values Additionally [13], they also argue that the usage of 
this authentication and key-exchange mechanism can be 
introduced in the SDP by just setting the "a" attribute 
defined with the values "a=idaka: base64 (ephemeral 
public key)" and "a=signature: base64 (signature)" [14]. 
 
The usage of the protocol would be limited in between SIP 
clients which have established a trusted relationship with a 
Trusted Authority and that have received a private key 
from it. There is a potential vulnerability when one of the 
parties is behind the PSTN network, since the 
authentication and key agreement would be done with a 
Media Gateway instead of the user. 
3.2 Certificate-less Protocol 
One alternative to the ID-based cryptography, which still 
does not rely on the PKI, is the certificate-less public key 
cryptography (CL-PKC) [15]. This approach still makes 
the use of a PKG, but the PKG only generates a 
component of the user’s private key (still based on his 
identity), while the second component is generated by the 
user. The trust relied on the PKG becomes similar to the 
one given to a Certification Authority (CA), that it won’t 
issue fake keys. Since the PKG does not have the user’s 
complete private key, it can’t decrypt or sign his messages, 
as a consequence, the key escrow is eliminated. 
• The steps necessary to set-up the certificate-less key 
pair are described below. Some of the steps do not 
need to be performed in the same sequence they are 
presented. 
• The PKG generates his master-key besides the public 
parameters for the public key cryptosystem using 
bilinear Diffie-Hellman Pairing. 
• The PKG generates the partial private key for the user, 
using the user’s identity as an input to the key 
generation algorithm.  
• The user chooses a secret value for him.  
• The user generates his public key based on the public 
parameters and his secret value.  
• The user generates his final private key, using the 
chosen secret and the partial private key provided by 
the PKG as an input to the key generation algorithm, 
which could also use his public key and identity in 
order to bind his key. 
 
It is worth to mention that Al-Riyami et al. propose the 
possibility of binding the identity parameter of the key to 
the public key, and therefore allowing the user to create 
only one public key for the same partial private key, 
besides, making it noticeable in case the PKG try to 
replace a public key of the user by one it knows the whole 
secret key.  
 
In order that the message is encrypted or the signature is 
verified, it is necessary that the users exchange their public 
keys or make them available at a public directory. 
Nevertheless, there is no need for any Authority to certify 
the key. The transfer and the checking of certificates is 
avoided, and consequently, their bandwidth and 
computational (processor and memory usage) overhead. 
 
The usage of CL-PKC in SIP towards the accomplishment 
of mutual authentication and key agreement, in a very 
similar way to the one presented in the previous item, is 
presented at [16]. The protocol presented by Wang et al. 
[16] is different from the proposal of Al-Riyami et al. [15], 
as the mutual authentication can be done in between 
clients independently of their security domains once their 
identities are bound to their public keys. The key escrow is 
eliminated since the PKGs no longer posses the user’s 
private keys. 
4. Analysis of Different Authentication 
Methods 
In this section we have highlighted the limitations of 
different authentication methods. 
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4.1 SIP Digest Authentication 
SIP Digest Authentication resolves some of the 
deficiencies of HTTP basic authentication approach by 
transmitting a MD5 or SHA-1 digest of the 
communicating parties’ credentials. Besides that, the use 
of the unique nonce value to challenge the sender prevents 
the reply attack. 
 
However, there are also some limitations of Digest 
authentication. One major problem of Digest 
authentication is that it requires pre-existing secure 
association for password distribution. As a result this 
scheme cannot ensure the security in a non-secure 
association such as proxy-to-proxy authentication across 
different domains of internet. The authentication scheme 
in such case has to rely on TLS or IPSec. The digest 
authentication is also vulnerable against chosen plaintext 
attack. If short or weak passwords are used then the 
attacker can intercepts many responses from different 
nonces, and then tries out the password with brute force. 
Another drawback of SIP Digest authentication scheme is 
that it doesn’t include any mechanism for proxy to User 
Agent Server (UAS) authentication. As a result, the 
authentication of the last hop in a SIP call routing is not 
possible using SIP Digest Authentication unless any lower 
layer security protocol is used. SIP specification 
recommends the use of Transport Layer security (TLS) or 
Datagram TLS (DTLS) [17] protocol to provide adequate 
level of protection to against the attacks. In addition to 
these methods, an extension of SIP digest authentication 
scheme is proposed to solve proxy-to-UAS authentication 
problem [18]. In this extension, some new headers are 
defined for the authentication such as: 
 
• 492 proxies unauthorized: used by UAS to challenge 
the proxy server 
• UAS-Authenticate Response Header: response to the 
challenge containing the credential of the proxy server. 
• UAS-Authorization Request Header: used by the 
proxy to send a request for the credentials of the UAS 
for mutual authentication. 
• UAS-Authentication info: used by UAS to 
authenticate itself to proxy server. 
 
The steps of the proposed authentication procedure are 
given in the Fig. 7. 
4.2 S/MIME 
SIP RFC recommends the replication of all header fields 
inside a MIME part, which exposes some problems. First, 
the SIP header fields might get altered by the intermediate 
SIP entities which make it difficult for the recipient to 
identify the legal or malicious changes in headers. Second, 
S/MIME solution also mandates the deployment of a 
global S/MIME Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). 
Otherwise, the exchanged public keys would be self-
signed, which makes the initial key exchange susceptible 
to man-in-the-middle attacks [19]. Third, SIP messages 
can be large by their size, which causes overhead for 
processing and transporting of the messages. 
 
 
 
Fig. 7 Proxy to UAS authentication using extended SIP Digest 
authentication. 
 
The possible solution of this problem has been discussed 
by Peterson [20], where he has proposed a new 
Authenticated Identity Body (AIB) to deliver the 
authenticated identity of the call parties. In SIP, AIB is 
basically a MIME body containing the authenticated 
identities. 
4.3 ID-based Cryptographic Authentication 
The ID-based protocol eliminates the need of PKI and 
makes it unnecessary the transmissions of the public keys, 
but at the expense of the need of relying in the security of 
a PKG, and the key escrow facility. The key escrow, 
depending on the context, can be seen as an advantage 
since it would be realistic to foresee that some countries 
may require the possibility of wire-tapping the 
communication between the users. It also does not allow 
the peer-to-peer usage whenever one of the users does not 
have his ID-based key pair, making it necessary that both 
of the parties have a trust relation with a PKG.  
4.4 Certificate-less mutual authentication 
This approach also eliminates the need of the PKI, 
although it is necessary for the parties to exchange their 
public keys. 
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Fig. 8 Summary of different authentication mechanisms. 
 
The advantage over the ID-based system is that the trust 
on the PKG is drastically reduced and the key escrow is 
eliminated. However, there is no process of revoking the 
keys. The Fig. 8 summarizes key features o different 
authentication mechanisms. 
4. Conclusions 
After analyzing the security aspects of the available 
methods, we can clearly see a move towards alternatives 
that do rely on neither the pre-shared keys nor a PKI. It is 
noticeable that the different approaches better suit 
different scenarios and they most-likely have focused on 
those scenarios. For a context where key escrow is 
necessary, the ID-Based solution should fit very well, 
while at the same time, proxy based authentication would 
be very suitable for a support or call center. From our 
analysis, we can see the appearance of a few new 
proposed Identity based authentication protocols that 
might lead to more satisfactory solution.  
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